Ontario’s Uninsured Vehicle Tort Bar: “I Owned It” is Not the End of the Story

October 07, 2026

Under Section 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act, a tort claim by the owner of a motor vehicle may be barred if he or she does not have insurance on the vehicle at the time of the incident, in contravention of s.2(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The recent decision in Bennett v. Arsenault, 2026 ONSC 5547 shows how the answer to this question is less clear-cut than it may appear on the surface. The Court in this decision addressed what happens when a plaintiff gives discovery evidence that appears to support ownership of a motor vehicle, but later seeks to rely on additional evidence to explain or contextualize that answer to say she was not the owner.

The Statutory Framework

Ontario’s statutory scheme can bar an injured person from recovering tort damages where, at the time of the incident, the person was contravening s. 2(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.25 (“CAIA”) in respect of the automobile.

Section 2(1) of the CAIA states that:

Subject to the regulations, no owner or lessee of a motor vehicle shall,
(a) operate the motor vehicle; or
(b) cause or permit the motor vehicle to be operated,
on a highway unless the motor vehicle is insured under a contract of automobile insurance.

Section 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 provides:

Despite any other Act, a person is not entitled in an action in Ontario to recover any loss or damage from bodily injury or death arising directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile if, at the time of the incident, the person was contravening subsection 2(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act inrespect of that automobile.

Background

In this motion, the Court considered whether the plaintiff required leave, and whether such leave should be granted, to rely on evidence said to correct, complete, or qualify her answers given at her examination for discovery.

The defendants’ position was that the plaintiff was an “owner” of the motorcycle she was using at the time of the motor vehicle accident giving rise to the claim. The defence intended to argue at a later summary judgment motion that the plaintiff’s action was barred by statute under s.267.6(1) of the Insurance Act because the plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle she was using and did not have appropriate insurance under s.2(1) of the CAIA, which would constitute a complete defence to the claim.

The defendants based their conclusion in part on the evidence given by the plaintiff at examinations for discovery. Specifically, the following excerpt:

Q. It was your understanding that you had purchased it?
A. Yes.
Q. And that you owned it?
A. Yes.

At the motion, the parties agreed that the second answer had to be read in context of the first: the plaintiff had agreed that, having purchased the motorcycle, it was her understanding that she owned it. The defendants did not argue that this was a formal admission. Instead, they argued that the plaintiff’s understanding that she owned the motorcycle was one piece of evidence relevant to whether she was an “owner” for purposes of the CAIA and Insurance Act statutory bar.

The plaintiff did not deny that she believed she had purchased the motorcycle. Rather, she sought to place that understanding in the context of the full transaction. The additional evidence the plaintiff sought to rely on included communications between the plaintiff and the vendor, the circumstances in which possession was transferred, the bill of sale, the plaintiff’s efforts to insure and register the motorcycle, what she later learned about its status, and alleged representations by the vendor about the motorcycle’s condition and roadworthiness.

The plaintiff’s position was that the vendor’s alleged misrepresentations rendered the purchase void ab initio. The defendants disputed both the factual and legal consequences of that argument.

Analysis and Result

Justice Mew held that the full evidentiary picture should be before the judge deciding the ownership issue. That includes the original discovery answers, the circumstances in which those answers were given, the plaintiff’s explanatory affidavit evidence, and the transaction chronology.

The Court emphasized that the original discovery answers were not withdrawn or replaced by the additional evidence. Their meaning and weight remain to be determined on the summary judgment motion. As a result of this conclusion, the Court held that a formal order to “correct” the discovery answers was not necessary. The later evidence did not replace the original answers, it simply formed part of the broader record. In the alternative, if leave was required under rr. 31.09(3) and 53.08(1), the Court held that it would have granted it.

Following r. 31.09(3), which requires information correcting or completing a discovery answer to be provided forthwith, the Court accepted that the plaintiff had a reasonable explanation for the manner and timing of the additional evidence. The Facebook communications relied on by the plaintiff had been produced expeditiously in response to a discovery undertaking. When it became apparent that the defendants were relying on the plaintiff’s discovery answer as evidence of ownership, the plaintiff responded by placing explanatory affidavit evidence before the Court.

Additionally, the Court found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants and no undue delay. The defendants still had the original discovery evidence and remained free to rely on the original answers and argue the meaning, significance, and weight of the full record at their summary judgment motion.

Key Takeaways

This decision helps to demonstrate that a plaintiff’s discovery answer that they “owned” a vehicle can be important evidence, but it may not be conclusive. A court may distinguish between a plaintiff’s lay understanding of ownership and the legal question of ownership under the statutory scheme. Here, the plaintiff’s answer remained part of the record, but it had to be assessed in context.

Defence counsel should be aware of this when conducting examinations for discovery. If ownership is an issue, counsel should consider asking more precise questions targeting the factual elements relevant of legal ownership, such as: who paid for the vehicle, who had possession, whether registration was completed, whether insurance was obtained or attempted, what the plaintiff understood about the transaction, and whether there were any alleged issues with title, condition, or roadworthiness.

At the same time, this decision is not a loss for the defence. The plaintiff’s original answers remain in evidence rather than being replaced by the additional evidence. The defendants may still rely on them and argue their significance on summary judgment.

For defence counsel, the practical message is that where a statutory bar depends on vehicle ownership, a plaintiff’s discovery answer that she “owned” the vehicle is useful, but it may not end the analysis. The defence should build a complete evidentiary record addressing the transaction, possession, registration, insurance, and control of the vehicle.