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A Commentary on Liberty v. Fernandes On Sept. 6, 2006, the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered its decision in Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company v. Fernandes (Docket
#C44262). At first blush, this
appears to be a finding against the insurer's interest. The Court of Appeal dismissed the
appeal and upheld the Motion Court Judge's ruling that an insurer does not have
the right to initiate a Court proceeding to challenge a CAT DAC. However, upon a
careful read of the Court of Appeal's Reasons, it would appear all is not
lost. In fact, quite to the
contrary. The Court analyzed the
entire SABS dispute resolution process.
In so doing, it gave particular meaning and emphasis not before placed
on sections 281 and 268 of the Insurance Act. In short, the Court
concluded that an insurer does not require recourse to the courts to challenge
a CAT DAC because it has the ability, consequent upon a failed mediation, to
simply offer any amount it feels it is prepared to settle the case. The onus then shifts
to the insured to institute whichever dispute resolution mechanism it wishes
(FSCO arbitration or Court action) to challenge the insurer's offer made
consequent upon a failed mediation.
Analysis As stated, the Court
came to this conclusion on the basis of its interpretation of
section 281(3) which reads as follows: Payment pending dispute resolution
At page 8, paragraph
16 of Liberty v. Fernandes, the Court of Appeal states: If mediation has
been tried and failed, the insurer can revert to paying only what it was
willing to settle for, until there is an agreement or an order directing a
different amount. As a practical matter,
this is quite likely a better result, from an insurer's perspective, than
having the ability to challenge a DAC by way of a Court determination. In essence, the Court
of Appeal has indicated that a DAC's findings are only binding pending a failed
FSCO mediation, after which time an insurer is only required to pay in
accordance with their last offer. This interpretation
accords with the plain wording of the legislation, and does give effect to the
previously‑understood operation by which only insureds could choose
between Court action or arbitration.
The Court takes this one step further in that, an insurer can make
whatever offer it wants (subject to its duties of good faith and the
consequences of its breach) consequent upon a failed mediation, shifting the
onus to the insured to institute any proceedings. The Fernandes case
dealt with an insurer's right to challenge a catastrophic determination by a DAC. The Court accepted the parties' agreement that a
catastrophic impairment designation is not a "pay pending resolution"
provision. Consequently,
section 281(3) and not section 281(4) was deemed to apply. The practical
distinction between those matters which fall within the ambit of
section 281(3) and 281(4) will, I respectfully speculate, not be
insignificant. For those matters
which are deemed to be "pay pending resolution", the Court has, by necessary
implication, indicated that section 281(4) is the operative
provision. Section 281(4) reads
as follows:
Procedure –
Pay Pending Dispute Benefits Accordingly, for those
matters where the pay pending resolution mechanism applies, it would appear the
process will be as follows:
Procedure –
Non-"Pay Pending" Benefits This mechanism is to
be compared to the procedure which presumably now applies with respect to
benefits which are not "pay pending resolution" in nature. That mechanism, pursuant to the
Fernandes decision is as follows:
Pay Pending or Not Pay Pending A great deal can turn on the determination of whether a particular
benefit is a "pay pending resolution" provision‑type benefit. Presumably, those
benefits whose dispute resolution language mirrors that of section 40 of
the Bill 59 SABS will be considered by the Court to be not pay pending. The operative language
considered by the Court of Appeal in Fernandes is that which is set out in
section 40(4) as follows: 40(4) The
determination by the designated assessment centre is binding on the insured
person and the insurer, subject to the determination of a dispute, in
accordance with ss. 279 to 283 of the Insurance Act, relating to whether
the impairment is a catastrophic impairment. The operative language
therein is: "binding on the
insured person and the insurer, subject to the determination of a disputeÉ". Similar language is
found in the attendant care internal dispute resolution provision at
section 39(10), the operative parts of which read as follows: 39(10)
The determination by a designated assessment centre is binding on the
insured person and the insurer in respect of the attendant care benefit,
subject to the determination of a dispute in accordance with ss. 279 to
283 of the Act. Accordingly, it would
appear that both an attendant care, and a catastrophic determination are
subject to the mechanism outlined in section 281(3) as dictated by the
Court of Appeal in Fernandes. Conversely,
section 37(5) which controls the "refusal or stoppage of income
replacement, non‑earner or caregiver benefits", contains the following
language: 37(5) The insurer may dispute the obligation
to pay a benefit in accordance with ss. 279 to 283 of the Act and, pending
the resolution of the dispute, the insurer shall pay the benefit". This appears to be the
type of pay pending provision properly contemplated by section 268(8) and
hence, section 281(4). Pursuant to Fernandes,
in order for an insured to truly obtain the benefit of the pay pending dispute
resolution provision, as it relates to weekly benefits, the insured must
commence a proceeding (FSCO arbitration or Court action) within 45 days after a
failed mediation. That appears to
be the only way an insured can preserve the pay pending DAC amount right
through to the end of a judicial determination. As stated, this option
does not appear to be available with respect to either attendant care or a
catastrophic determination. It would appear that
pursuant to and consistent with the Fernandes decision and section 281(3),
an insurer is relieved of its obligation to pay the DAC amount for attendant care
or those amounts required pursuant to a catastrophic determination by a DAC,
once there has been a failed FSCO mediation and an offer made by the
insurer. In short, in our view,
weekly benefits are governed by section 281(4) and requires the insured to
commence proceedings within 45 days of a failed mediation to preserve the DAC
pay pending amounts; whereas attendant care benefits and catastrophic
designation dependent benefits amounts (i.e. housekeeping beyond 104 weeks) are
governed by section 281(3) and permit an insurer to offer whatever amounts
it is willing to settle for, shifting the onus on the insured to commence a
proceeding to attempt to obtain any greater amount(s). Obviously, the only
issue litigated in Fernandes was the catastrophic determination and hence, all
other conclusions contained herein are at present simply our views in light of
the legislation and the Fernandes decision. This analysis and the
Fernandes decision consider the Bill 59 SABS as it read prior to the March
2006 (elimination of the DAC) amendments. © Rogers Partners LLP - 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of Rogers Partners LLP. |
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